Business models of international banks in the wake of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis by Merck, Manuel et al.
Manuel Merck Martel, Adrian van Rixtel and Emiliano González Mota (*)
BUSINESS MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL BANKS IN THE WAKE OF THE 2007-2009 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
(*) Manuel Merck Martel, Adrian van Rixtel and Emiliano González Mota are economists at the International Financial 
Markets Division - DGA International Affairs at the Banco de España. Adrian van Rixtel is currently working at the 
Monetary and Economic Department at the Bank for International Settlements. The authors appreciate the valuable 
comments received from Vicente Salas and José Manuel Marqués. 
This article is the exclusive responsibility of the authors and does not necessarily reflect the views either of the 
Banco de España or the Bank for International Settlements.

BANCO DE ESPAÑA 99 ESTABILIDAD FINANCIERA, NÚM. 22
BUSINESS MODELS OF INTERNATIONAL BANKS IN THE WAKE OF THE 2007-2009 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
This study provides an analysis of developments in the business models of large internationally 
operating banks over the period 2006-2010. The investigation focuses on a sub-group (peer 
group) of the largest internationally active banks in the world (10 institutions out of a wider 
group of 22), which allows for an in-depth comparison of their business models, balance sheet 
structures and performance. Our findings support the view that commercial banking oriented 
business models proved more resilient during and in the aftermath of the global financial crisis 
(2007-2009) due to their relatively modest exposures to trading and derivatives activities, their 
greater reliance on stable sources of funding and larger diversity of business lines.
Regarding perspectives for the future, the regulatory environment is the key challenge for 
banks’ business models in the years ahead of us. The evidence shown through the article 
strongly suggests that regulation should take into account its business model. On this 
issue, the article briefly discusses how some characteristics intrinsically linked to the 
business models have been taken into account in several recent important regulatory 
initiatives such as those that address the systemic and moral hazard risks associated with 
large financial institutions and those aimed at isolating or ring fencing retail banking vis-à-
vis investment banking. 
The internationalisation of the banking industry has intensified during the past few decades, 
both in terms of cross-border capital flows and cross-border entry in banking sectors 
overseas. As shown in Chart 1, international banking exposures grew at average annual 
rates above 10% since the mid nineties and up to the start of the financial crisis in the 
advanced economies, and gathered strength in emerging economies in the years up to 
the crisis (2003-2007). This process occurred in parallel with the globalisation of international 
trade and brought important benefits in terms of economic welfare across the globe 
[Goldberg (2009), CGFS (2010c)]. The rapid advance of international banking also had 
important repercussions for funding and liquidity management at the institutions involved, 
and resulted in a diverse range of practices across the spectrum ranging from centralised 
to decentralised banks [CGFS (2010b)]. All in all, international banking has been an 
important channel for allocating financial resources around the globe and by doing so has 
contributed significantly to supporting world economic growth and increasing the financial 
linkages between areas with excesses of savings and others with lack of them. 
The rapid expansion of international banking was interrupted sharply by the 2007-2009 global 
financial crisis which saw important reductions in banks’ international activities and exposures 
(Chart 1). The crisis has led to important restructurings of business models and international 
strategies of many globally oriented banks, often aided by unprecedented government 
support in the form of substantial capital injections, asset protection schemes and liability 
guarantees [Stolz and Wedow (2010)]. Moreover, cross-border bank linkages proved 
important transmission channels of the crisis, which predominately had its origin in the 
mature economies and their complex financial systems, to emerging market economies 
[Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011a)]. Hence, the high degree of interconnectedness of the 
global banking system, established over the previous years through the interrelated 
processes of financial liberalisation, globalisation of trade and finance and financial 
innovation, contributed to spread the impact of the financial crisis on domestic banking 
systems across the world [Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008)]. 
1 Introduction
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This article provides an analysis of developments in the business models of large 
internationally operating banks over the period 2006-2010, thus including the global 
financial crisis, which have seen important changes in the global banking landscape. The 
investigation focuses on a sub-group (peer group) of the largest internationally active 
banks in the world (10 institutions out of a wider group of 22), which allows for an in-depth 
comparison of their business models, balance sheet structures and performance. 
The analysis distinguishes between four, relatively simplified and general business models 
for internationally operating banks: The specialised investment bank, the investment 
banking oriented diversified or universal bank, the commercial banking oriented diversified 
or universal bank and the specialised commercial bank (see Table 1). 
Our findings support the view that commercial banking oriented business models proved 
more resilient than the specialised and diversified investment banking business models 
during and in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (2007-2009). In fact, the balance 
sheet structure of both the specialised commercial bank and commercial banking 
oriented universal bank models displayed relatively modest adjustments after 2008, 
while those of numerous banks adopting investment banking oriented business models 
changed relatively strongly, with significant relative reductions in securities markets 
activities, on the assets side, and in trading and derivatives exposures, on the liabilities 
side. This was compensated by relative increases in retail and wholesale lending 
activities, and in deposit financing. All in all, most investment banking oriented universal 
banks in our sample started to move towards the business model of the commercial 
banking oriented universal bank. In this process, international bank exposures in 
developed countries experienced a contraction and have not recovered previous rates of 
growth, in contrast with the remarkable rebound in developing economies – as Chart 1 
suggests –.
The structure of the article is as follows. In Section 2 we provide an overview of the various 
business models of large global banking groups, which shows the large dispersion in the 
their activities – retail, wholesale commercial, investment banking and asset management – 
among banks. We also discuss recent trends in the size of banks and provide evidence of 
the significant increase in the concentration of international banks. The subsequent section 
focuses on the performance of the banks in the peer group, which reveals important 
differences in behaviour across countries as well as inside the same country. Section 4 
investigates in depth the funding modes of several of the banks, which shows the existence 
SOURCE: BIS.
NOTE:  Exchange rate adjusted.
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of strongly different funding structures between different business models. Moreover, the 
section highlights the differences in liquidity management of large globally active banks, 
which range between centralised and decentralised approaches. Finally, the last section 
presents our conclusions, including a discussion of the challenges and perspectives of 
international banking. The Annex shows different financial indicators for the group of the 
largest globally active banks. 
The international banking groups that dominate global banking are organized across a variety 
of business models, depending on historical and geographical characteristics, comparative 
advantages and strategic choices. A traditional separation, especially in the US industry, has 
been that between investment and commercial banks. Investment banking entails underwriting 
securities issuance for corporate and government clients, advice in mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A), sales and trading activities in financial markets (including securities lending activities) 
and asset management business, financed predominantly by wholesale funding, as 
investment banks as a rule have limited access to deposit funding.1
During the past decade, investment banks developed relatively new business lines such 
as proprietary trading, – which involved trading in financial markets with the firm’s own 
funds –, and prime brokerage business, which entailed providing financial services, 
including clearing and settlement services and securities lending to professional investors 
such as hedge funds. By contrast, commercial banks in the US fund themselves largely 
through deposits and hence had access to the liquidity facilities of the Federal Reserve, 
while their business was concentrated on providing retail and wholesale lending to 
households and corporations. With the adoption of the Gramm-Leach-Billey Act, in 1999, 
the traditional separation between investment and commercial banks in the US was 
overturned which allowed for the establishment of universal banks that combined a wide 
range of banking activities in one bank holding company [Komai and Richardson (2011)]. 
Hence, the US moved towards the global dominant business model of universal banking, 
that other advanced countries had already accepted – initially in Europe and later in 
Japan as well –. 
Given the fact that a large range of business undertakings is possible for banking groups 
active in the international arena, it is convenient to distinguish between specialised and 
diversified business models [ECB (2010)]. Specialised banks are banks that restrict 
themselves – only or predominantly – to a few activities, for example investment banking 
or retail banking services. By contrast, diversified or universal banks combine different 
banking activities in one organisation, for instance a bank combining investment banking 
and corporate banking activities. 
In order to analyse the impact of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis on the business models 
of large global banking groups we focus on the 22 banks that belong to the list of the largest 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) in the world, as published by the Financial 
Times in November 2009 [FT (2009)]. The choice of the sample was based predominantly on 
business model, size and geographical criteria.2 They can be split into four groups along the 
2  Recent trends in global 
banks’ business 
models and size
1  Due to regulatory constraints, the five US investment banks that existed before the 2007-2009 financial crises 
– Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns – did not have deposit-
taking business.
2  US commercial banks (Bank of America-Merrill Lynch, JP Morgan Chase and Citigroup), US investment banks 
(Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley), banks from respectively the euro area (including the two largest Spanish 
banks Banco Santander and BBVA), the UK and Japan, and finally banks from some other countries, i.e. 
Switzerland and Canada (UBS, Credit Suisse and Royal Bank of Canada). The Annex provides a set of financial 
indicators that allows for a more detailed inspection of these banks.
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lines of the business model/speciality matrix represented in Table 1. For the sake of simplicity 
we have further restricted the number of banks shown in the tables and graphs to 10 
institutions, which form our peer group of banks representative of each category. 
First, the model of the specialised or “pure” investment bank, such as for example Goldman 
Sachs.3 Second, the investment-banking oriented diversified or universal bank, which 
includes Barclays, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank and UBS. These banks show predominantly 
investment- banking related exposures in both asset and funding structures, but at the 
same time they have significant business lines related to more traditional commercial 
banking activities. Third, we have identified the model of the commercial-banking oriented 
diversified or universal bank, of which Citigroup and HSBC and the two largest Spanish 
banks, i.e. Banco Santander and BBVA, are examples. Here, the orientation towards 
commercial banking may involve a diversification into retail and wholesale banking, or a 
specialisation on either retail or wholesale banking business, while at the same time 
maintaining considerable exposures to investment banking activities.4 Finally, we define 
the specialised or “pure” commercial bank as characterised by a very high concentration 
of business activities on both deposit funding and retail and wholesale lending. We use 
funding characteristics as the main criterion to classify a commercial bank, taking into 
account that the financial crisis put the spotlight especially on banks’ funding structures. 
3  Although both Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley changed their official status from investment bank to 
traditional bank holding companies in October 2008, which was a pragmatic move to obtain access to the full 
range of liquidity facilities of the Federal Reserve and to avoid using mark-to-market accounting for certain 
assets [Wall Street Journal (2008)], their actual business model remained that of a specialised investment bank.
4  Our data source Bankscope does not unequivocally provide data on retail and wholesale bank lending activities 
for all banks and hence we cannot provide more detailed classifications of retail and wholesale-oriented 
commercial banks.  
Commercial Banks Investment Banks
Specialised
Its funding structure is dominated by customer  
deposits, and it is characterized by a reduced 
exposition to trading and derivatives.
The asset structure comprises strong lending activity 
(retail /wholesale), and shows limited trading business.
(i.e.: Mitsubishi UFJ).
Its funding structure is dominated by short-term debt 
?nancing and by a signi?cant exposure to trading and 
derivatives. Customer deposits ?nancing is not 
signi?cant.
The asset structure is depicted by the considerable 
contribution of investment securities and trading 
activities.
The asset structure is characterized by reduced lending 
activity (retail / wholesale)
 (i.e.: Goldman Sachs & Morgan Stanley)
Diversi?ed or Universal
Its funding structure is dominated by customer deposits, 
although it shows a more diversi?ed pro?le than that of 
specialized commercial banks. 
The ?nance structure exhibits a reduced exposure to 
trading and derivatives .
The asset structure displays a relatively los contribution 
of trading activities.  
Customer deposits ?nancing and lending activities (retail 
/ wholesale) play a relevant role compared with 
investment banking oriented universal banks. 
 (i.e.: Citigroup, HSBC, Banco Santander and BBVA).
 (i.e.: Barclays, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank and UBS).
SOURCE: Merck, Van Rixtel and González.
Its funding structure is dominated by short and long-term 
debt issuances and signi?cant exposures in their trading 
and derivatives portfolios. 
Signi?cant degree of ?nancing through customer 
deposits though lower than that in the commercial 
banking oriented universal banks' segment. 
The asset structure shows a solid presence of 
investment securities and trading activities.
The asset structure contains considerable lending 
activity (retail / wholesale), although lower than that in the 
commercial banking oriented universal banks.
TOTAL ASSETS OF THE MOST INTERNATIONALLY-ACTIVE INSTITUTIONS TABLE 1
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Hence, a very high relative dependence on deposit funding has prevalence over a very 
high relative share of retail and wholesale lending to classify a bank as a specialised 
commercial bank. In our sample, Mitsubishi UFJ fulfils the criteria of this business model.
Changes in the asset structures of these ten banks over the period 2006-2010 are shown 
in Charts 2 to 4. For the sake of clarity, we have aggregated various asset items to show 
more clearly developments in retail and corporate lending, lending to banks and securities 
markets activities, which include a wide range of items such as securities holdings and 
trading and derivatives exposures. 
Goldman Sachs distinguishes itself as the specialised investment bank, with around 80% 
of its assets related to securities markets activities and negligible activities in retail and 
corporate lending at end-2010 (Chart 2.1) and around 30% of its assets linked to trading 
activities, the highest share of the ten banks that we analyse in more detail. Furthermore, 
after the unprecedented dislocations in international interbank markets, in 2008, Goldman 
Sachs reduced rather significantly its lending to banks, limiting further the already very 
modest lending business. By contrast, Mitsubishi UFJ displays the model of the 
specialised commercial bank, with very high – in relative terms – lending business to 
households and enterprises and very little trading activity (at only around 8% of its total 
assets) (Chart 2.2); most importantly, its funding structure has the highest dependence on 
retail deposits of all banks in our sample (see Section 5). At the same time, this bank 
maintains a large securities portfolio, which consists largely of securities holdings, 
especially of government bonds 
At end-2010, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank and UBS securities markets activities 
amounted to between 55% and 70% of their total assets; at the same time, retail and 
wholesale lending operations amounted to between 20% and 35% of total assets (see 
Chart 3). The investment banking orientation of these banks was highlighted in 2008, when 
their derivatives exposures increased very strongly due to valuation adjustments in the 
context of the financial crisis. The combined derivatives and trading positions of the four 
banks as a percentage of their total assets jumped bringing their total securities markets 
activities to between 55% and 80% of total assets for that year.
2.1  ASSET STRUCTURES 
OF SPECIALISED BANKS
2.2  ASSET STRUCTURES 
OF DIVERSIFIED OR 
UNIVERSAL BANKS
SOURCE: Bankscope.
a Mitsubishi UFJ reports according to the Japanese ?scal period. Thus, 2010 end-of-period data are re?ected by the statements released on 31.03.2011.
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Barclays, BNP Paribas and Deutsche Bank expanded substantially their commercial 
banking activities in relative terms after 2008, as shown by the increasing shares of their 
lending to retail and corporate customers. This process was fostered by important 
acquisitions, such as the takeover of Fortis by BNP Paribas and that of Deutsche Postbank 
by Deutsche Bank. The exception was UBS, which experienced a very significant 
deleveraging after 2008, undergoing major changes in its business model. The dominant 
move towards commercial banking after 2008, is reflected in significant declines in the 
shares of derivatives and trading activities, with Deutsche Bank and Barclays mostly 
reducing derivatives exposures in relative terms, and BNP Paribas lowering its trading 
activities. The data also show that Barclays and UBS, followed by BNP Paribas, retreated 
significantly from interbank lending activities in recent years, owing to the severe impact of 
the financial crisis on international interbank funding markets. 
The commercial banking oriented business model (Citigroup, HSBC, Banco Santander 
and BBVA) can be seen in the relatively large size of their lending activities that totalled 
between 45% and 65% of total assets at end-2010, and which consisted of retail, non-
financial corporate wholesale and interbank lending (see Chart4). At the same time, their 
nature as universal banks was reflected in the importance of securities markets activities, 
between 25% and 40% of total assets. Notwithstanding relevant investment banking 
SOURCE: Bankscope. 
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business, these banks are characterised by relatively small shares of derivatives and 
trading exposures in their asset structures, those of Banco Santander and BBVA being the 
lowest. The data show that basically all four banks increased the share of retail and 
corporate lending in total assets during the past few years, while generally reducing the 
share of interbank lending, which seems related to the impact of the global financial crisis. 
Besides, their balance sheet structures have been more stable than those of other banks. 
Overall, the detailed investigation of the ten banks in our sub-sample shows in general the 
dominance of the diversified or universal bank model. The diversification trend in global 
finance, involving the emergence of large financial conglomerates covering a wide range 
of financial services including commercial and investment banking, asset management 
and insurance, has been interpreted as a positive development generating significant 
economies of scope to the benefit of especially large international clients [Institute of 
International Finance (2010)]. The results of empirical research on this phenomenon have 
been somewhat mixed, with earlier studies suggesting that functional diversification of 
banking groups reduced their economic value rather than enhancing it, providing 
arguments against combining different business lines in one universal bank [Schmid and 
Walter (2006), Laeven and Levine (2007)]. More recent empirical studies, though, indicate 
that the business diversification of banks, including international diversification, may 
SOURCE: Bankscope. 
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improve their value and hence support the view that economies of scope may be 
pronounced in banking [Gulamhussen et al. (2011), Elsas et al. (2010); for a more nuanced 
view, see Van Lelyveld and Knot (2009)].
The trend of functional diversification adopted by most large global banking groups has 
been intertwined with the significant increase in the consolidation and concentration of 
banking services into fewer and much larger banking conglomerates [De Nicolo et al. 
(2004), Buch and DeLong (2010), Herring and Carmassi (2010)]. The 2007-2009 financial 
crisis seems to have reinforced this trend rather significantly when looking from 2006 to 
2010. Table 2 shows the size of 22 of the largest international banks in the world which 
were considered systemically important (SIFIs) by the Financial Times (developments in 
their total assets are depicted in Annex 1). At end-2010, the amount of total assets of 19 
of these banks had increased when compared with 2006, in a majority of cases at double 
digit growth rates.5 Only three experienced a decline in total assets from 2006, Morgan 
Stanley, UBS and Credit Suisse, all of them banking groups either specialised or 
predominantly diversified into investment banking activities. 
SOURCE: Bankscope and calculations from the authors.
a Rates of increase in local currency. Balances at the end of 2010 (31.12.2010) except for Japanese institutions (31.3.2011) and Canadian institutions (31.10.2010). 
Total Assets
Evolution since the 
end of 2006
2010 Closing data 
(billion dollars)
31.12.2010 31.12.2009 31.12.2008 31.12.2007 31.12.2006
BNP Paribas SA + 2,669.9 -2.9 -3.7 17.9 38.7 
Deutsche Bank AG + 2,546.3 27.0 -13.5 -1.0 21.2 
HSBC Holdings Plc + 2,454.7 3.8 -2.9 4.3 31.9 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Inc. + 2,392.5 1.4 4.7 8.5 12.0 
Barclays PLC + 2,323.9 8.0 -27.4 21.4 49.4 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc + 2,267.7 -14.3 -39.5 -23.5 66.8 
Bank of America - Merrill Lynch + 2,264.9 1.9 24.6 32.0 55.2 
JPMorgan Chase & Co. + 2,117.6 4.2 -2.6 35.6 56.7 
Citigroup Inc. + 1,913.9 3.1 -1.3 -12.5 1.6 
Mizuho Financial Group, Inc. + 1,896.7 3.0 5.6 5.0 8.1 
ING Groep N.V. + 1,666.4 7.2 -6.3 -5.0 1.7 
Banco Santander, S.A. + 1,626.8 9.6 16.0 33.4 46.0 
Société Générale SA + 1,512.7 10.6 0.2 5.6 18.3 
UBS AG – 1,406.4 -1.7 -34.6 -42.1 -43.9 
UniCredit SpA + 1,242.0 0.1 -11.1 -9.0 12.9 
Credit Suisse Group AG – 1,101.9 0.1 -11.8 -24.2 -17.8 
Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. + 911.3 7.3 3.0 -18.6 8.7 
Morgan Stanley – 807.7 4.7 22.6 -22.7 -27.9 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, S.A. + 738.6 3.3 2.4 10.1 34.2 
Royal Bank of Canada + 712.9 10.9 0.3 21.0 35.3 
Standard Chartered Plc + 516.3 18.3 18.7 55.9 91.9 
Nomura Holdings, Inc. + 442.9 13.8 47.7 39.5 2.3 
Rate of increase from 2010 (a) with respect to:
TOTAL ASSETS OF THE MOST INTERNATIONALLY-ACTIVE INTITUTIONS TABLE 2
  
5  Data for Japanese banks are as of the end of the fiscal year, i.e. end of March. Data for Royal Bank of Canada 
are as of the end of October.
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The longer-term trend of increasing total assets of the world’s largest global banks from 
2006 to 2010 has been buttressed by substantial consolidation processes in several 
national banking systems, sometimes with public support, which have resulted in higher 
degrees of concentration in national markets.6 Some of these processes involved large 
government financial support or private-public sector partnerships, i.e. private solutions 
with public assistance (such as the takeover of Bear Stearns by JP Morgan Chase); other 
were private sector “only” solutions, for example the takeover of Washington Mutual by JP 
Morgan Chase. Some cross-border resolutions of failed banks changed the structure of 
the domestic banking industries substantially, such as the takeovers of Bradford & Bingley 
and Alliance & Leicester by Banco Santander, of Fortis by BNP Paribas and of certain parts 
of the investment banking and capital markets business of Lehman Brothers by Barclays. 
At the same time, in the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis, the banks in our sample 
showed a downward adjustment of their size: Of the ten largest banks, seven had smaller 
balance sheets in 2010 than in 2008. For some banks, this deleveraging was very 
pronounced: Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS and Barclays reduced their total assets between 
2008 and 2010 by 40%, 35% and 27% respectively (Table 2). In the case of UK banks, this 
restructuring occurred on the back of significant public support. The process of 
deleveraging also resulted in downward adjustments of the balance sheets of Goldman 
Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the two remaining US independent investment banks, which 
was corrected somewhat after 2008 (Annex 1, Chart 1.B).
Notwithstanding the deleveraging of banks’ balance sheets since the peak of the turmoil, 
the financial crisis doesn`t seem to have interrupted the longer-term trend of increasing size. 
Only three out of the 22 banks considered had lower total assets in 2010 than in 2009 
(Table 2). Clearly bank resolutions processes have had an upward impact on the size of 
various globally operating banks. But there are other factors to explain the longer-term trend 
of increasing size in banking. One is the significant economies of scale identified in banking, 
where larger size generates efficiency benefits derived from technological advantages and 
allows for better diversification of risk [Wheelock and Wilson (2009), Feng and Serletis 
(2010) Hughes and Mester (2011)]. Additional factors of more strategic nature should not be 
discarded. For instance, very large banks can benefit from lower funding costs arising from 
an implicit government guarantees that they would not be allowed to fail7; Brewer III and 
Jagtiani (2011) show that banks may be willing to pay a premium for mergers that would 
increase their size to a level generally perceived as being “too big to fail”. 
In addition to size, the 2007-2009 global financial crisis had a strong impact on the performance 
of the largest international banking groups as well. One of the most widely used indicators for 
bank performance is the return on average equity (ROE), measured by net income over 
the average of total equity at the end of the year. It shows how well a bank has performed 
on various profitability categories, during a particular year, and indicates how competitive 
the bank can be in raising equity in financial markets [Hempel and Simonson (1999)]. 
ROAEs for our peer group of the largest global banks are shown in Annex 2. Most banks 
experienced a sharp decline in profitability for the reporting year 2008. However, the banks 
that display more stable ROEs and have kept them high over the period 2006-10 are 
3  Recent trends in global 
banks’ performance
6  At the same time, this process does not seem to have resulted in a strong adjustment in the overall size of the 
industry.
7  At the same time, it needs to be acknowledged that larger banks may hold funding advantages over smaller 
banks that may be due to a variety of factors and not necessarily only to “too big to fail” arguments [see Standard 
& Poor’s (2011)].
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commercial-banking oriented universal banks without exception, most notably BBVA, 
Banco Santander, Standard Chartered Bank and Royal Bank of Canada (Annex 2). Nomura, 
Royal Bank of Scotland and UBS, all of them investment-banking oriented universal banks, 
are on the opposite side. Moreover, the most profitable global banks in 2006, i.e. Goldman 
Sachs and Morgan Stanley, displayed a rather high variability of their return on average 
equity over the subsequent years. 
Interestingly, the data show a marked recovery in profitability after the sharp decline in 
2008, for most banks reaching levels of ROAE in 2010 not far from those prevailing in 2006, 
prior to the outbreak of the financial crisis. This is indicated by rather pronounced V-shape 
patterns in the evolution of return on average equity for many large internationally active 
banks (Annex 2). At the same time, there are notable differences in levels of ROAE among 
banks in different countries. In particular, Japanese banks display relatively low rates of 
profitability as demonstrated, reflecting well-known historical patterns and business 
practices such as emphasis on long-term banking relationships and relatively low income 
growth [Oyama and Shiratori (2001), Loukoianova (2008)]. Among euro area banks, the 
most profitable ones over 2006-2010 were the two leading Spanish banks. 
The performance of internationally active and diversified banks has been the subject of 
considerable empirical research [see CGFS (2010b)]. The international expansion of banks 
may improve their risk profile and increase their risk-adjusted return or profitability through 
geographical diversification and efficiency gains [see for example García-Herrero and 
Vázquez (2007)]. 
Banks may fund themselves through a wide range of sources of financing, including deposits, 
equity and debt. A standard classification of funding models differentiates between wholesale 
and retail funding. The former includes central bank liquidity, interbank loans, with a prominent 
role for international interbank short-term US dollar funding, other short-term debt, most 
notably repurchase agreements (repos) and commercial paper (CP), and longer-term debt. 
Sometimes, equity financing is included in wholesale funding as well. Retail funding is 
essentially funding through customer deposits, such as current, savings and term deposits. 
During the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, banks’ funding models experienced rather 
unprecedented shocks, both in terms of access to funding and of cost. Large internationally 
operating banks had built up important maturity and currency mismatches between asset 
and funding structures [CGFS (2010a)]; in particular, specialised investment banks and 
investment-banking oriented universal banks had increased significantly their leverage 
[Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011)]. In the summer of 2007, tensions emanating from US subprime 
mortgage markets spilled over to banks’ short-term wholesale funding markets and 
liquidity conditions deteriorated rapidly, particularly for highly leveraged banks. Contagion 
through interconnectedness of major global banks and their funding models led to sharp 
and unprecedented increases in interbank money market interest rates; in this setting, 
European banks had difficulty in obtaining US dollar liquidity [Domanski and Turner (2011)]. 
Moreover, US investment banks, which had become highly dependent on short-term 
wholesale funding – particularly on repo and CP financing – in the years prior to the 
financial crisis as a way to leverage their balance sheets, experienced severe dislocations 
in their funding [Adrian and Shin (2010)]8. As a matter of fact, the collapses of both Bear 
4  Recent trends in global 
banks’ funding and 
liquidity management
8  US investment banks’ use of repo borrowing increased by almost one trillion dollar from 2004 to 2007, of which 
an increasing part consisted of overnight repos, i.e. repurchase agreements with a maturity of just one day 
[Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011), Adrian and Shin (2010)].
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Stearns and Lehman Brothers were highly related to their inability to access any longer 
these short-term funding markets, as investor confidence in their business models had 
eroded. These problems were not only circumscribed to US investment banks: the demise 
of Northern Rock in the UK was also caused by funding strains in short-term wholesale 
financing, on which its business model depended crucially [Shin (2009)]. 
The disruptions in short-term funding markets prompted central banks worldwide to inject 
substantial amounts of liquidity into the system and the Federal Reserve granted US 
investment banks unprecedented access to its liquidity facilities. All in all, central bank 
liquidity became a major source of wholesale funding. Moreover, after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers some governments supported the funding of their globally operating 
banks, to the detriment of a level playing field in global banking.
In order to analyse banks’ funding models, we use detailed breakdowns of the funding of 
banks in our narrower sub-sample of ten banks. The breakdown includes retail deposits, 
short-term wholesale funding (interbank and repo financing), derivatives and trading 
positions, long-term debt, other debt and, for completeness sake, equity (Charts 5 to 7). 
Similar to our findings for asset structures, we find significant differences between the 
specific funding structures of these banks. 
Goldman Sachs represents the specialised investment bank model, with essentially no 
deposit funding and significant reliance on short-term wholesale funding and other debt 
financing (Chart 5.1). In 2008, when the crisis hit especially the funding of investment 
banks, its interbank and repo funding experienced a considerable reduction (in relative 
terms), but in 2010 the shares of these financing sources had returned to pre-crisis levels. 
Furthermore, in 2009 and 2010 Goldman Sachs exposures to derivatives, in relative terms, 
were significantly lower than in 2008. Turning to the other specialised model, around 60% 
of Mitsubishi UFJ funding in 2010 depended predominantly on customer deposits, the 
largest figure in our sample, which has remained rather stable throughout 2006-2010; use 
of other sources of financing, such as short-term wholesale funding instruments, was 
rather stable as well, with little diversification to liability items such as trading, derivatives 
and long-term debt (Chart 5.2).
4.1  FUNDING STRUCTURE 
OF THE SPECIALISED 
BUSINESS MODELS
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The funding structure of investment banking oriented universal banks displays a relatively 
modest share of customer deposits, at just 20%-30% of total funding in 2010, but maintained 
substantial liability positions in derivatives and trading, an important characteristic of this 
business model (Chart 6). These banks experienced major shifts in their funding structure 
after 2008. The most significant change was a rapid and substantial decline in derivatives 
in 2009 and 2010, which had increased very strongly in 2008, mostly due to market 
valuation adjustments of financial derivatives’ trading positions resulting from the financial 
crisis. Regarding other important changes in these banks’ funding structures, they all 
increased their use of customer deposit financing after 2008, and hence moved more 
towards the commercial banking oriented business model. 
By contrast, the funding of the diversified commercial banks was characterised by a 
much larger share of customer deposits – of between 40% and 50% at end-2010 – 
(Chart 7). After 2008 they showed an ever greater recourse to deposit financing (in 
relative terms), at the expense of short-term wholesale funding. This latter development 
was a trend clearly visible among commercial banking oriented universal banks, 
including BBVA and HSBC, especially when comparing the figures for 2010 with those 
for 2006 or 2007.
4.2  FUNDING STRUCTURE 
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The trend towards greater recourse to customer deposit funding by both investment and 
commercially oriented universal banks is clearly visible in the evolution of loans to deposits 
ratios, shown in Annex 3. If this ratio is higher than one, a bank needs other funding 
sources to finance its loans. For a majority of banks, the loan to deposit ratio declined 
rather significantly during 2006-2010, and especially after 2008.
Overall, in the aftermath of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis large international banks’ 
funding models have shifted towards more stable funding sources, with increasing 
reliance on customer deposits. At the same time, many banks – especially commercial 
banking oriented universal banks – reduced their recourse to short-term wholesale 
funding markets.9 The crisis revealed important shortcomings in funding models mainly 
concentrated on short-term wholesale debt instruments. 
The crisis also revealed the importance of intra group capital transfers which turned out 
to be an effective tool to support foreign affiliates in distress during the turmoil [Navaretti 
9  The rating agencies generally view retail deposit funding as the most reliable and stable source of bank funding 
[see for example Fitch (2011)]. Deposit funding may be more beneficial also due to the existence of deposit 
insurance schemes, which mitigate the likelihood of bank runs and lower the attractiveness of market-based 
funding modes, regardless the quality of borrowers [Greenbaum and Thakor (1987)]. 
SOURCE: Bankscope. 
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et al. (2010), Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011b)]. Large international operating banks seem 
to have considerable flexibility in moving around sizeable amounts of funding inside their 
global organisation, which contributes to their financial resilience and versatility [De 
Haas and Van Lelyveld (2010)]. Of course, this aspect is closely related to their funding 
and liquidity management practices. In the case of centralised banks, the funding of 
foreign subsidiaries relies on intra group loans from the parent bank which is the 
institution raising funds in financial markets. By contrast, the non-centralised liquidity 
management model is characterised by a high degree of financial autonomy, in which 
every subsidiary raises financing in financial markets under its own name and according 
to its own credit rating. The centralised model has certain advantages for banks in terms 
of economies of scale and cost efficiencies, but it also entails risks in terms of lighter 
monitoring by markets of banks’ global funding operations, while being more prone to 
mispricing of risk as well. It is worth mentioning that, on the contrary, in the decentralized 
model funding is carried out by the final user of these funds, i.e. the subsidiary in need 
of funds which is the institution that taps markets under its own name and its own risk 
profile. As a consequence in the decentralized model it is easier for markets to accurately 
assign and price the risk involved in the funding than in the centralized one as in the 
latter case it is the matrix the institution that gets financing. In the wake of the 2007-2009 
financial crisis, international banks have gradually increased funding through local 
sources of financing in the foreign markets where they operate [CGFS (2010b)]. At the 
same time, evidence suggests that global banks have increased centralisation of liquidity 
management, through tighter monitoring of liquidity buffers and short-term liabilities at 
their headquarters. 
The analysis presented in this article showed that overall the commercial banking 
oriented business models proved more resilient during the global 2007-2009 financial 
crisis when compared with the investment banking oriented models, due to their relatively 
modest exposures to trading and derivatives activities, their greater reliance on stable 
sources of funding through customer deposits and larger diversity of business lines 
which allows to compensate losses in some business segments with revenues from 
alternative sources [see also: Boston Consulting Group (2009), ECB (2010), Standard 
and Poor’s (2011)]. When comparing the balance sheet structures of both specialised 
commercial banks and commercial banking oriented universal banks in 2006 and 2010, 
they show relatively similar composition. In contrast, the balance sheets of banks which 
adopted investment banking related business models, especially investment banking 
oriented universal banks, experienced rather significant changes in balance sheet 
structures during this period. More specifically, in 2008, at the height of the financial 
crisis, these banks showed strong increases in derivatives exposures on their liabilities 
side, which were significantly reduced in 2009 and 2010. In general, the weight of 
securities markets activities on the assets side and of trading exposures on the liabilities 
side fell and, at the same time, retail and wholesale lending activities, especially the use 
of customer deposit financing, increased. All in all, most investment banking oriented 
universal banks in our sample moved towards the business model of the commercial 
banking oriented universal bank after 2008. 
The crisis and the related increase in the number of bank resolutions worked as important 
catalysts behind the longer-term trend of increasing the size of global banks. More 
structurally, economic strategies such as achieving significant economies of scope and 
scale may have been important drivers as well, both for the diversification of business 
activities, as evidenced by the dominant business model in our sample of the diversified 
or universal bank, and for increasing size of large global banks. At the same time, “too big 
5  Conclusions, 
challenges and 
perspectives
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to fail” advantages such as lower funding costs for banks that are perceived systemically 
important cannot be excluded as an important reason behind the trend of larger international 
banking groups.10
Regarding challenges and perspectives for the future, it is clear that the regulatory 
environment is the key challenge for banks’ business models in the years ahead of us. 
The evidence shown through the previous sections strongly suggests that regulation 
aimed at reducing the likelihood and the impact of failure of any large internationally 
active financial institution should take into account the business model it conducts. In this 
regard, it might be opportune to look at several recent important regulatory initiatives 
such as those that address the systemic and moral hazard risks associated with large 
financial institutions and those aimed at isolating or ring fencing retail banking vis-à-vis 
investment banking. 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) 
have developed a framework to deal with the “too-big-to-fail” issue based on the two 
objectives.11 First, the objective is to reduce the probability of failure by improving the loss 
10  Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2011) show that systemically large banks display lower profitability and higher 
risk, suggesting that it is neither in the interest of their shareholders nor regulators for them to become too large 
relative to the size of their national economies. On the basis of these findings the authors suggest that regulatory 
intervention may be warranted were such an outcome to materialise, such as additional capital charges or in 
the extreme case downsizing or splitting up of business activities. However, size restrictions may have 
unwelcome effects as well as demonstrated in Dermine and Schoenmaker (2010), such as a lack of credit risk 
diversification in case size reduction would imply less internationally diversified banks.
11  See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Global systemically important banks: assessment methodology 
and the additional loss absorbency requirement”, November 2011.
SOURCE: BIS and Bankscope.
NOTE:  Exchange rate adjusted. 
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absorbency of the financial institutions subjected to the regulations. Second, an additional 
goal is to reduce the impact of failure by improving global recovery and resolution frameworks. 
To attain the first goal, the proposals entail new requirements for the banks that have been 
identified as systemically important at the global level. In particular, an additional loss 
absorption capacity is tailored to the impact of their default within a range from 1% to 
2.5% of risk-weighted assets that should be met with common equity. In addition, the FSB 
and BCBS propose changes in national resolution regimes, additional requirements for 
resolvability assessment and for recovery and resolution planning and, last but not least, 
for more effective supervision. All these measures have been approved by the G20. Thus, 
institutions identified as Global Systemically Important Financial Institutions (G-SIFIs) will 
have to adapt to this regulation from 2012 onwards and its full implementation is targeted 
for 2019. Chart 9 represents our initial assessment of how the G-SIFIs identified by the 
BCBS fit in the categorization of business models described in this article. Chart 8 shows 
the size of balance sheets of institutions by category at end-2010. 
The assessment methodology developed to identify the systemic importance of G-SIFIs 
follows a multiple indicator-based measurement approach that encompasses many 
dimensions of systemic importance and includes parameters such as cross-jurisdictional 
activity, size, interconnectedness, substitutability/financial institution infrastructure and 
complexity. On top of it, some qualitative information incorporated in the supervisory 
judgement completes the assessment. 
Indeed the business model of institutions influences some of the categories aforementioned, 
especially those of interconnectedness and complexity. However, as shown in the chart, 
the list of institutions identified as G-SIFIs contains, according to our assessment, banks 
in all categories without a clear bias to any. In fact, at first glance it seems that the number 
of specialized investment banks is relatively low, though admittedly it might be explained 
by the failure of very noticeable ones in the crisis. As the data show, the relatively low 
prominence of investment banks is further exemplified by the (much) larger size of total 
assets of the more retail oriented banks.
SOURCE: Own elaboration with Bankscope data.
a Retail Ratio = (Net Customer Loans + Customer Deposits) / Total Assets.
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Following the well-documented high resilience and stability of the retail banking model, 
which also find support in this article, some could argue that the G-SIFIs identification 
criteria do not take into account sufficiently the benefits of this model. However, in this 
regard, advocates of the BCBS approach may counter that the concept of “systemically 
important” is much richer than just focusing on different business models. In fact, the 
additional requirements imposed on any G-SIFI depend on its scoring insofar institutions 
are allocated into one out of five possible buckets (eg. riskier banks should be allocated 
to higher ranked buckets and thus be asked to fulfill stricter additional capital 
requirements). In any case, what it is clear is that regulation should and in fact has taken 
into account (sufficiently or not) idiosyncrasies associated with the different business 
models of banks.
In the regulatory arena, two national initiatives that may impinge on the business model of 
banks are also worthwhile to be commented. The first one relates to the recommendations 
of the Independent Commission on Banking for UK banking (ICB report), especially those 
ones directed at institutions that combine retail services with global wholesale and 
investment banking operations. The second one has to do with certain regulations proposed 
in the US to implement the Volcker rule and in particular to its unintended consequences 
and extraterritorial effects.
The ICB report proposes ring-fencing retail banking activities that would make it easier 
and less costly to effectuate the resolution of any banking institution, would allow for 
targeted policies towards banks in difficulties and would minimize the need for public 
support. Besides, according to the report, structural separation of activities should help 
insulate retail banking from external shocks. Interestingly, the report is very favorable to 
business models that provide a great degree of financial autonomy to subsidiaries versus 
centralized models. It is important to note that the ICB report does not ask for complete 
separation of activities and institutions could maintain the advantages derived from 
economies of scale. Moreover, according to the ICB, the recommendations proposed are 
neutral with regard to the various business models of UK banks. 
Having said all that, the report advocates additional loss absorbency requirements for 
large UK retail banks (equity capital of at least 10% of risk weighted assets, which exceeds 
the Basel III level for G-SIFIs) and acknowledges that the proposed reforms affect only a 
relatively small proportion of wholesale and investment banking activity in the City. The 
argument for the latter is to avoid any adverse effect on the competitiveness of UK banks 
versus foreign banks. The ICB view on the need for additional burdens imposed on large 
retail oriented banking groups is defended as a compensation for the possible “too big to 
fail” implicit subsidy these institutions benefit from. This reasoning might implicitly endorse 
the belief that these large and key retail banks will be rescued by the public sector in case 
it would be needed, whereas small retail banks and wholesale and investment oriented-
banks would be allowed to fail. The merits of the proposals in the ICB report are indeed 
considerable. However, challenges remain with regard to their implementation and it might 
be argued whether the “no bail out” assumption for large investment banks versus large 
retail ones will be followed in case of a financial crisis with systemic effects. 
The US approach to isolate retail banking from other activities that is embedded in the 
Volcker rule is quite different, though in essence its objectives are close to those of the ICB 
proposals. In a nutshell the Volcker rule prohibits any link between retail business (which 
benefits from FDIC deposit insurance) and other activities, particularly proprietary trading, 
prime brokerage business for hedge funds or risk capital activities, except for exceptions 
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to be detailed. As a consequence, it either interdicts any relation or it imposes the compliance 
with severe information requirements to qualify for the exception. The proposed US 
regulation clearly differentiates among business models and it interferes with the relations 
between retail and investment business. This is an issue particularly relevant for large 
institutions and among other things it regulates the links between the subsidiaries of non-
US banks active in the US with their parent banks. This issue may have severe potential 
consequences for the activities carried out by those foreign institutions and in fact is under 
review by US authorities. Some private institutions (among those the Institute for 
International Finance, IIF) have called for a sufficient degree of coordination regarding 
those regulatory initiatives with extraterritorial consequences. 
In addition, regulatory developments may induce the movement of specific business 
lines out of banks – both commercial and investment banks – and into the non-bank 
financial sector, such as hedge funds, private equity and asset managers. This may 
provide further impetus to the development of the so-called Shadow Banking System. 
Moreover, regulatory changes may lead to a further consolidation of large globally active 
banks, as scale and scope economies, infrastructure and distribution channels will 
become more important to maintain competitive positions [Morgan Stanley and Oliver 
Wyman (2011)]. This could buttress the longer-term trend towards bigger size of large 
international banking groups and higher industry concentration that we observe in our 
analysis. With respect to perspectives for funding structures, the prevailing view is that 
the greater recourse to deposit financing observed in the aftermath of the financial crisis 
in 2008 may continue for the foreseeable future, implying greater competition for deposits 
between banks (ECB, 2009 and 2010). This trend may entail new challenges as well, as 
enhanced competition in deposit markets may lead, according to certain academic 
research, to an increase in risk, if banks compete for market power offering higher deposit 
rates [Craig et al. (2010)].
All in all, and despite the recent financial crises, international banking has not lost its 
dynamism and continues to provide important amounts of financing, especially to the 
fastest growing economies in the world. These international activities of globally active 
banks are of considerable strategic importance in their well-diversified business portfolios 
and form a traditional source of revenues on their balance sheet. Indeed, the diversity of 
business models for banks active internationally is welcome. However, as shown in the 
article, the so-called universal commercial banking oriented business model has shown a 
particularly high degree of stability and resilience to the international financial crisis, an 
issue that may have to be taken into account in pending regulation.
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SOURCE: Bankscope.
a Japanese institutions (Chart 2.d) report in accordance with the japanese ?scal year. Thus, 2010 end-of-period data are re?ected by the statements released on 
31.3.2011. 
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